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The Interface between Internal and External Audit in the Australian 
Public Sector 
 
1. Introduction and Background 
 
Prior research in the private sector has considered the relationship between internal and 
external audit (eg, Edge and Farley 1991; Krishnamoorthy, 2002; Munro and Stewart, 2011). 
Nevertheless, due primarily to the relatively recent formal introduction of internal audit into 
public sector agencies across jurisdictions in Australia, little research exists examining the 
relationship between external and internal audit in that sector. This study begins to bridge the 
gap in the extant literature by examining the extent of reliance placed by the external auditor 
on the work of the internal audit function within one of Australia’s largest public sector 
agencies. Insights are also provided into the factors which determine this reliance given the 
myriad externalities influencing the process. To ensure confidentiality the actual agency – a 
police force - and state will remain anonymous.1 ABC Police was selected for the case study 
for various reasons. Firstly, the organisation has the largest internal audit function of all state 
government agencies; secondly, it has received accolades for its financial reporting; thirdly, 
whereas some agencies outsource their internal audit function that was not the case here; 
fourthly, it was expected that if communication channels were flawed then this could very 
well be the case across all agencies; and, finally, it provides fertile ground for future research 
using agency theory in the context of multiple principal/agent relationships. Recent changes 
to the auditing standards, specifically the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
(AuASB)'s Auditing Standard ASA 610 Using the Work of Internal Auditors, and how these 
changes are likely to impact the decision to rely upon the work completed by internal audit, 




A number of regulatory reforms have resulted in an increasing emphasis on the role of 
internal audit as an important corporate governance mechanism in both the private and public 
sectors (Goodwin, 2004). While there are crucial differences between internal auditing in the 
two sectors (Coupland, 1993), public sector reforms have sought to reduce these differences, 
especially in relation to governance (Barrett, 2002a, b). This has been achieved largely by the 
public sector adopting governance and management frameworks with underpinning origins in 
the private sector. Such efforts suggest that reform efforts may result in models being made to 
fit the public sector rather than developing appropriate sector specific models. 
 
As internal audit becomes more widely implemented in the Australian public sector, the 
potential for external auditors relying on the work of the internal auditors increases (Ward 
and Robertson, 1980). The extent of such reliance will, however, inter alia, depend upon the 
ability and willingness of external and internal auditors to communicate effectively with the 
aim of increasing their co-ordination efforts (Haron et al., 2004; Brody et al., 1998). Prior 
research in the private sector concluded that three factors – 'competence, objectivity and work 
performed' – are used by external auditors to determine whether or not to rely on internal 
auditors' work (Haron et al. 2004: 1151). An important contribution of this study is the 
investigation of these private sector concepts within a public sector setting. Given that public 
funds are used by state government agencies to provide services, efficiencies are an important 
consideration within the public sector.  
 
Internal and external audit are clearly significant monitoring mechanisms for ensuring 
efficacy and efficiency in public sector expenditure in their own right. However, appropriate 
reliance by external audit on internal audit can also achieve significant efficiencies including: 
managing myriad stakeholders; communicating planned objectives; ensuring timely audits 
are conducted; and avoiding duplication (McPhee, 2005). Although outside the scope of this 
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paper, the audit committee (as the third point of the audit trinity) also plays an important role 
in the interrelationship between internal and external audit. Zammit and Baldacchino (2012) 
found that better communication and more readiness to consult were two factors needing 
improvement when they examined the relationship between internal and external audit 
functions in Malta's public sector. Zammit and Baldacchino (2012) claimed this finding was 
generalisable across other countries, both developed and developing.  
 
The importance of communication between the external and internal auditors is well 
documented in the literature (including in ASA 610 updated in October 2009). It has been 
argued that communication barriers between the two can significantly impair the efficiency 
and effectiveness of an audit (Brody et al., 1998). Whittington (1989: 125) noted that whilst 
effective communication minimises the overlap of audit efforts, it requires 'joint planning and 
co-ordination, open lines of communication and a consideration of various aspects of human 
relations'.  
 
The following section provides a brief review of the literature and an introduction to the 
Australian public sector. This is followed by the theoretical framework and the research 
design. The penultimate section articulates and discusses the results with the final section 
concluding the article. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Internal auditing is designed to support organisations in achieving their objectives (Internal 
Auditors in Australia (IIA, www.iia.org.au)) and has evolved from risk management, control 
and governance processes (Gay and Simnett, 2007), to an assurance and consulting service 




There has been extensive research on the importance of an internal control function as part of 
an effective corporate governance structure. Prior internal audit research has evaluated: 
objectivity issues (Church and Schneider, 1992; Brody and Lowe, 2000; Stewart and 
Sabramaniam, 2010); the interaction between internal and external audit (Stein et al., 1994; 
Brody et al., 1998; Felix, Gramling, and Maletta, 2001; Mihret and Admassu, 2011; Prawitt 
et al., 2011); the trend to outsource internal audit functions (Caplan and Kirschenheiter, 2000; 
Dickins and O'Reilly, 2009; Majdalawieh and Alkafaji, 2012); and the relationship between 
internal audit and the audit committee (Leung, et al., 2004; Christopher, et al., 2009; Davies, 
2009; Sarens et al., 2009). 
 
More recently, research pertaining to the role of internal audit has broadened to encompass 
risk management and corporate governance (Brody and Lowe, 2000; Carey et al., 2006; 
Leung et al., 2011). Internal auditors can add value by providing assurance that 
organisational risks are properly identified and managed (Leithhead, 1999; Walker et al., 
2003). In Australia, legislation establishes internal and external audit arrangements 
(Goodwin, 2004). In this case, the relevant state legislation and regulations apply to all 
government entities and requires them to establish an internal audit function. 
 
The contemporary corporate governance setting has led to a greater focus on the relationship 
between internal and external auditors (Gramling et al., 2004). The work performed by 
internal auditors may affect external audit efficiency as it can be a factor in determining the 
level of work required (Schneider, 1985). Inter alia, ASA 610 provides guidance to the 
external auditor in this regard.   
 
Communication helps ensure the placing of an appropriate level of reliance on the work of 
the internal auditors (eg, ASA 610, para 4; Lempe and Sutton, 1994; Brody et al., 1998; Felix 
et al., 2001). Within the police itself, prior literature (although relatively scarce) supports the 
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need for greater communication within and between relevant stakeholders (Collier et al., 
2004). Aligned with co-ordination and communication is the desire to reduce the total audit 
fees charged. Any efficiencies (and inefficiencies) gained can be reflected in the audit fee 
(Lempe and Sutton, 1994; Brody et al., 1998; Felix et al. 2001). In the Australian public 
sector, the issues of efficiency and the quantum of audit fees are considerably more complex 
given the interests of the taxpayer. In relation to this state, efficiency is important because 
fees are determined via a cost recovery model. Hence rewards for efficiency flowing from – 
amongst other things – internal and external audit co-ordination are prized by audited entities.  
 
However, audit processes are also informed by the relationships surrounding the organisation 
being audited. In the case of the public sector these relationships are very complex. This 
means that the relationship between internal and external audit is critical in achieving an 
efficient and effective audit outcome. As such, a major difference between the public and 
private sectors in relation to audit, is the complexity resulting from a multiplicity of 
audiences (e.g. the parliament, the ministry, the public sector agencies and the public itself) 
each with very different expectations. For instance, Rainey (1997: 38) argued that 'public 
agencies are born of and live by satisfying interests that are sufficiently influential to 
maintain the agencies' political legitimacy and the resources that come from it'. The Minister 
will always be more concerned with what the voting public thinks of him/her whereas 
taxpayers just want to see effective services being provided. As a result, the objectives of 
each function (internal and external audit) may be different and the differences are likely to 
be enhanced by the interests of agents. The findings from this research will inform and 
influence literature in this area by answering the research question posed in the abstract, 
being: 'Using reliance as the pivotal consideration, what factors determine the efficient and 




3. Theoretical Framework 
Research in auditing has traditionally been carried out under the framework of agency theory 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986). Literature is either scant regarding theoretical frameworks for 
auditing in the public sector or it implicitly relies on research pertaining to the private sector. 
Since auditing is a monitoring mechanism on the veracity of financial reporting, agency 
theory is an appropriate starting point from which to examine the relationship between 
external and internal audit in the public sector.  
 
Much of agency theory focuses on notions of accountability with Mayston (1993) arguing 
that the principal-agent model and accountability holds in the public sector. However, public 
sector accountability is 'not a simple one-to-one relationship between a principal and agent' 
(Mayston, 1993: 77) but is a relationship between a number of different groups whose 
economic and political interests overlap. Conducting effective and efficient audits becomes 
more critical to accountability given the multiple principal-agent relationships in the public 
sector (Cheng, 1994; Morrell, 2006). It is argued that, for the purposes of the research 
reported here, there are direct and indirect principals and agents in a democratic state. Such 
clarification is important as it allows for a more direct assessment of the findings. Singleton 
et al. (2003) identifies that members of the government (that is, ministers or the cabinet) will 
be punished by perceived inefficiencies in the public sector. As such, a direct principal – 
agent relationship can be said to exist between the elected government and the public sector 
which is charged with the implementation of the government’s policy. Hughes (2003: 236) 
considers that '[t]here is a fundamental requirement in a democratic system for accountability 
from the administration to the political leadership'. While the community is important, the 
government stands or falls based, in part, on its administrative record and so has a more direct 





To reduce these costs, governments (principals) demand and the public sector (agents) supply 
monitoring of their activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A contribution of this paper, then, 
is to confirm the role of agency theory in explaining the need for, and outcomes associated 
with, audit in the public sector and indeed to confirm the role of the external and internal 
auditors in enhancing public accountability notwithstanding the highly politicised 
environment.  
 
The political dimension is important here as the police agency considered in this case is a 
high profile one that is constantly under the scrutiny of commentators and the public at large. 
The government members of parliament are likely to be punished when the police do not 
perform well – or are perceived not to have performed well – and so the Commissioner and 
senior staff within the agency come under political pressure to perform. With the external 
auditor reporting to the parliament and the internal auditor to the Commissioner of Police (the 
Chief Executive), the ability of the external auditor to rely on internal audit may be reduced 
markedly as their audiences’ expectations are potentially quite divergent.  
 
4. Research Design  
Research Method 
A qualitative approach was adopted for this research using a single case study (as described 
shortly). In general terms, since the late 1980s, case study research has been seen as a 
response to the call to develop a greater understanding of how management accounting 
actually functions in organisations and society (eg Hopwood, 1979 and 1983; Jensen, 1983; 
Kaplan, 1983, 1986; Yin, 1994; Gill, 2009). In this research, use of an in-depth case study 
allowed the researchers to gain an understanding of the relationship between internal audit 
(ABC Police Management Audit Unit (MAU)) and the external auditor (Office of the 
Auditor-General (OAG)) (Kennerley et al. 2003). 'How' questions (eg How much do you 
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perceive the OAG relies upon the internal audit work?) were determined to be important in 
generalising to the theoretical proposition establishing the relationship between multiple 
agents and principals in the public sector (Yin, 1994). Such a relationship is a complex one 
with accountability driving the requirement for efficiencies between the two. Focused 
interviews consisting of both open- and close-ended questions were conducted with questions 
based on the experience of the main author, prior literature (in particular Goodwin, 2003; 
Gramling and Hermanson, 2009; Martinov-Bennie and Soh, 2009) and discussions with the 
Assistant Director of the ABC Police MAU. In regards to questions for the OAG, these were 
designed from responses received from the Police MAU interviewees and, again, prior 
literature.  
 
Initially document analysis was undertaken. This analysis was one component of a dual 
method approach designed to obtain a full understanding of the ABC Police MAU (see for 
example, Miller and O'Leary, 1998; Lapsley et al., 2010). Then, structured interviews of nine 
staff employed in internal audit activities within the MAU – consisting of both sworn police 
officers and civilian staff – were undertaken.2 Hence, all levels of staff from the most junior 
internal auditor through to the manager of the MAU, were interviewed. These interviews 
were conducted during 2010. This was a typical year for ABC Police with no more than 
normal media attention being paid to the organisation. Prior to the formal interview process, 
ethical clearance was provided by all participants. To enable the researchers to have more of 
an understanding of the MAU staff, short questionnaires were sent to each member prior to 
the day of the interviews. These questionnaires sought information on issues such as 
qualifications, time as an auditor, and time spent with ABC Police (see Appendix I).  
 
Each interview itself took approximately one and a half hours. The interview questions were 
designed to gain as much information as possible about the assurance audit process. It was 
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essential to consider the perceptions of each of the interviewees who represented different 
levels of the audit process (see Appendix II). Similar to other case study / interview research 
(see for example Qian et al. 2011), all interviewees were supplied with a consent form which 
they were asked to sign on the day of the interviews, and a participant information sheet 
explaining the research. If the interviewees agreed (which all did), then interviews were 
recorded, with a research assistant typing notes directly into a laptop and physical notes being 
taken by the researcher. These notes and recordings were subsequently transcribed. The 
documented transcriptions were then sent back to the relevant participants for confirmation.  
 
In regards to the external auditor, seven staff involved in the police audit team from the OAG 
were also interviewed. As above, the interviewees included all levels of auditors involved in 
the audit team. Again consent forms and participant information sheets were supplied; 
interviews recorded and notes taken which were subsequently transcribed and checked by the 
interviewees. Personal information was not obtained from the OAG staff as the OAG was the 
only external auditor and all staff were required to follow a set remit. The interviews were 
then analysed using thematic analysis with coding done manually (see, for example, 
Creswell, 2007). Findings from the interviews were subsequently aligned with the document 




ABC Police is responsible for policing a geographically large jurisdiction. This is an 
important issue as, politically, service delivery requirements and social outcomes are difficult 
to achieve in many geographically isolated communities where there are very high risk 
populations. Ministers are required to ensure the government's 'politically acceptable' 
outcomes (including service delivery) are achieved at the lowest cost possible (English and 
Guthrie, 2002). When disparities between metropolitan and regional service delivery are 
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identified or when poor or inappropriate performance is identified, significant political 
consequences usually follow. Given the discussion above emphasising the political aspect, an 
example here would be when police stations are closed in lower populated areas, the public 
show their displeasure by the way they vote. Hence, ministers or local state representatives 
can find themselves being exposed negatively in the media and without a job at the next 
election (see, for example, Rainey, 1997; Redmayne et al., 2010). This reality would suggest 
that, while quantitatively these regions may be immaterial, there is a significant qualitative 
materiality to public sector service delivery within them.  
 
The agency has an organisational structure comprising three regions, 14 districts, 163 police 
stations and approximately 5,000 police officers. As an integral part of ABC Police, the 
MAU is a small multi-disciplinary team that has been formed to independently appraise the 
activities, operations and systems of the agency. In line with research considering the role of 
internal audit in an organisation (see for example, Arena and Azzone, 2009) the MAU 
provides an internal audit function intended to add value to the management of the agency by 
reporting findings and making recommendations aimed at reducing any prospective incidence 
of unintended outcomes and at increasing efficiency. It has a legislated mandate to examine 
all parts of the agency and plays an important role in providing independent advice to 
management in support of the agency's efficient and effective operation.  
 
The MAU undertakes key internal audit functions including assurance audits and reviews of 
controls; comprehensive topic audits; coordination of the Business Area Management Review 
(BAMR)3 program; and other associated activities such as internet and email monitoring, 
professional consultation and management initiated reviews. Of note, with ABC Police 
covering a large geographical area, it is impractical for the MAU to audit all districts within 
its jurisdiction. Of course, as discussed above, this reality has ramifications possibly resulting 
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in adverse political and functional outcomes with the result of reduced political support for 
the government. BAMR involves senior police officers auditing various aspects of the record-
keeping and operation of police stations on a regular basis such that all aspects are audited at 
least once during a twelve month period. The BAMR program plays a significant role in 
achieving the MAU's goals by identifying and addressing weaknesses particularly in each 
business area’s procedures, systems and management practices. Internal governance 
processes are reviewed to ensure continued compliance with relevant statutory requirements 
and agency policies as well as the safeguarding of resources within the agency. 
 
In relation to this case, the Auditor General is supported by the OAG and, by legislation, is an 
independent officer of the parliament. The State Auditor-General audits the ABC Police. 
 
5. Findings and Discussion 
In regards to this research, information was obtained about the process and perceived 
efficiencies around the internal and external audit. Three major findings were evident from 
the study relating to reliance, planning and resource allocation. Implicit in each of these 
findings was the issue of communication.  
 
Reliance 
The first finding related to the internal audit’s perception of the extent of reliance placed on 
their work by the external audit team. Prior research in public sector internal auditing reports 
that more than 85% of internal audit functions coordinate the areas of audit coverage with the 
external auditor; two thirds coordinate their work schedule; and access by external auditors to 
internal audit work papers and reports does not present a problem (Goodwin, 2004). These 
results appear consistent with findings here. Unfortunately the internal audit staff assumed 
the external auditors were relying on their work based on the number of reports requested (as 
per ASA 610). However, according to Funnell (2003), what is actually in these reports may 
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not enhance accountability if it isn't relevant to the particular stakeholder. In this case, and it 
will be evident below, Funnell (2003) was correct. Within the MAU itself, confidence was 
displayed with all respondents claiming that the external auditors placed between 80 – 100% 
reliance on their work. Comments included: 
They would rely a lot on my team's efforts, at least 80-100%. (MAU)4 
 
The external effort relies so much on what the internal audit does because they 
have very limited hours that they can devote to auditing an agency this size. 




On the other hand, the external auditors had an entirely different viewpoint. BAMR audit 
results were relied upon while MAU audit results were not – notwithstanding the reported 
comments from the external auditor that BAMR has 'issues' (discussed later in this section). 
According to respondents from the external audit team, a significant reason that BAMR 
results were relied upon was that it was too costly to send an external audit team to various 
parts of regional parts of the State. However, external audit was, nevertheless, careful to gain 
an understanding of the work done. As to other controls, it was found that a maximum of 
15% of internal audit work was relied upon.  
Not more than 15% - and that is BAMR. (OAG) 
 
I would say that we probably don't rely a lot on internal audit mainly because of 
the way our methodology is at the time. (OAG) 
 
Reasons for this discrepancy included timing of cycles, duration examined and scope of the 
audits. 
Historically as it turns out the main impediment for our reliance has been the 




Questions need to be asked as to why this is a recurring problem. The ABC Police have 
received formal recognition for their reporting, so their competence is not in question. In their 
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response to questions about reliance, some interviewees claimed that the external auditors did 
not communicate their degree of reliance to the MAU and so the perceptions of both internal 
and external audit have remained unchanged over a number of periods. A recognition that 
barriers to communication exist between internal and external auditors is critical before 
improvements in communication can be made (Brody et al., 1998). A lack of communication 
can also be an indication of a lack of trust which, in turn, impacts on reliance. For example, 
external auditors are not taking full advantage of internal audit work completed. Reasons for 
this lack of reliance are not communicated sufficiently. It could even be intimated that some 
of the internal audit team work in silos: 






The second finding related to the planning of internal audits. It was evident that risk 
management is now considered explicitly in regards to planned and requested audits across 
the Agency.  
It has sharpened our resolve to better identify and allocate our projects or our 
audit work according to risk (MAU). 
 
We have now got a recognised framework, a risk management framework that 
applies right across our organisation that I can use based on what that [the risk 
management framework] generates (MAU). 
 
It acts as a basis to direct our audit resources. Before we did not have that – it was 
ad hoc and reactive (MAU). 
 
The twelve Attributes of Effectiveness is an auditing framework [that]… may be 
considered dated by today's standards [but which]… provides a sound basis to 
develop internal audit plans (MAU). 
 
Initially risk management was an audit thing, a control thing … but it is now 





Of course, the above comments do not deal with the propensity for the most senior staff in the 
organisation to require ad-hoc and unplanned work to be prioritised above planned work. The 
MAU considered that their annual audit activities included incorporating a 'planned' 
component whilst at the same time responding to demands from across the agency – 
particularly from the Commissioner – to conduct ad-hoc audits at various times during the 
year. Although, from the MAU's viewpoint, the external auditors see the internal audit plan 
prior to it going to the Audit and Risk Management Committee, very little external input is 
received. This is an issue in relation to audit efficiency and the extent to which external audit 
seeks to inform internal audit with a view to ensuring work done by internal audit 
supplements that of external audit. The external auditors on the other hand claimed they 
provided input as to the areas they would like the MAU to focus on. As mentioned above, 
this lack of communication results in the external audit's perception that the MAU won't 
change their planning strategy. Where in the process this breakdown in communication 
occurs is something to be established by the parties involved. Notwithstanding the MAU’s 
considered opinion that the external auditors provide minimal input, the following comment 
was made by a member of the OAG’s team: 
Part of our planning is obviously to consider the work with internal audit.  So 
there we have a meeting with the Assistant Director in the area and one or two of 
the other guys. We meet with him to see what type of reliance we can place on 
the work based on the audit planning. Before the audit plan goes to the audit 




The external auditor meets with the MAU on a regular basis throughout the year. The 
identified lack of communication appears less a result of a lack of opportunity than a lack of a 
planned approach to meetings or the fact that more pressing issues may be imposed by 




Agency costs are likely to increase when ad-hoc internal audit work takes precedence over 
planned work and when the planned internal audit work carried out is not relied upon by the 
external auditor. Ad-hoc requirements are in many cases evidence of the very political nature 
of the direct principal / direct agent relationship discussed earlier. This outcome might be 
averted by the application of additional resources toward the achievement of the internal 
audit plan, allowing for a resource allocation to take on ad-hoc work as it is identified. 
However, this has costs associated with it and may mean that, in time, more ad-hoc 
responsive work is undertaken rather than planned audit work. 
 
A Further Finding – Resource Issues 
The last finding was concerned with how an internal audit function operating in a jurisdiction 
which is spread over a vast geographical area, can effectively and efficiently audit all the 
locations and operations within the agency. While resource allocation in these areas may be 
relatively immaterial, as described above, many locations service vulnerable communities 
and poor performance potentially excites significant political repercussions resulting in 
political costs to the government (direct principals). As a control self-assessment tool, 
theoretically it was considered by ABC Police that BAMR had the potential to be an 
excellent resource. However, there were still significant problems associated with the 
resourcing of the function using uniformed officers in regional locations. In these areas in 
particular, where human resources were limited, questions were raised by the external auditor 
as to the effectiveness of the controls and the ability of the staff to perform these self-
assessment audits.  
The issue is because the country towns are not interested in the compliance – they 
are not trained to do so and their priority is not there. Also the staffing level ... 




In other words, it was recognised by the OAG that BAMR may have resourcing issues. The 
competency of the staff to conduct effective internal audits was questioned by the external 
auditor. This lack of competence is likely to lead to a lack of reliance which was also raised 
by the MAU. Finally, the MAU identified the practice of using sworn officers to conduct 
audits as problematic: 
Officers on the ground think it is something onerous and it has been pushed down 
on them.  Whereas if you said to them, right you have just locked someone up for 
stealing, you have to do this, that and the other.  They understand that very well. I 
think there has to be more education. The supervisors need to get this right. 
(MAU) 
 
Under these circumstances, questions are raised as to the extent to which external audit could 
realistically rely on such results. Yet, findings revealed that the majority of OAG staff 
interviewed claimed they relied 100% on BAMR. Additionally, the finding increases the 
importance of the overall finding that communication is not effective between the external 
and internal audit teams. Although both the external auditor and MAU manager recognise 
there are serious issues, a lack of communication results in no effective solution being 
advanced. 
 
6. Implications and Conclusions 
The initial objectives of this research were to determine: (1) the extent of reliance placed by 
the external auditor on the work of the internal audit function; and (2) the factors impacting 
that reliance. Findings included in the previous section highlighted a lack of reliance on the 
work of the internal audit function in a large Australian public sector agency. Some of the 
relevant issues or factors included: (1) resource issues such as limited hours; limited human 
resources; and the cost associated with auditing regional areas of a large state; and (2) 
confusion in what each function expected of the other (that is, problems in the planning 
stage). A perceived lack of competence of some staff conducting the internal audit, in turn, 
implied a lack of trust. The decision by the external auditors as to what extent they rely on the 
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work of the ABC Police internal audit function has clear ramifications for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the audit and how this process enhances public accountability (eg Felix et al. 
1998). Underlying all these findings, was the critical reality that each party perceived the 
level of successful communication differently.  Communication – or a lack thereof - was 
implicit in each of the findings discussed in Section 5 – reliance, planning and resources. 
However, neither party seemed to have identified it as an issue. 
 
Hence, one major implication of this research is the need to improve communication channels 
between the external and internal auditors. This could be generalizable across other agencies 
as well as across state jurisdictions (particularly given this supports prior literature in other 
countries, for example, Collier et al., 2004). Internal audit functions in other high profile 
agencies are also likely to suffer from ad-hoc demands from senior management resulting in 
higher agency costs to the extent that these ad-hoc assignments render the planned internal 
audit work unreliable by the external auditors. From the OAG's perspective, if more 
efficiencies could be achieved, then less audit work would need to be outsourced, thus 
reducing overall costs required to be recovered. From the agency’s perspective, with all 
public sector agencies being told regularly they need to reduce their expenditure this is one 
possible area which could contribute to the reduction.  
 
Of course, communication barriers are also likely to have a negative impact on the efficiency 
of the external audit. With the changes to ASA 610 focusing on communication between the 
external and internal auditors, this presents an opportunity for improving the coordination 
between the two parties to contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of the external audit. 
Opportunities are likely also to arise to provide training and professional development in the 
area of communication and coordination between the external auditor and internal auditors. 
Effective coordination should be achieved in the planning stage and hence the OAG might be 
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best placed to prioritise this training and to lead it in an effort to effectively re-establish 
effective communication. As the changes to ASA 610 take effect, public sector agencies (via 
the audit committees) together with the OAG could develop best practice operational 
procedures around communication between auditors.  This, in turn, could lead to increased 
efficiencies and potentially lower audit fees in the medium term. At the least, it could lead to 
the maintenance of real costs to auditees over the medium term. Improved communications 
between external and internal auditors is likely to result in MAU being able to focus their 
planned audits while allowing for ad-hoc requests thereby achieving their audit objectives 
and reducing agency costs.   
 
As discussed above, Mayston (1993) recognised that instead of there just being a single 
principal / agent relationship in relation to public sector accountability, there are a number of 
different groups whose economic and political interests overlap. Conducting effective and 
efficient audits becomes more critical to accountability given the multiple principal-agent 
relationships in the public sector. In the police there are multiple relationships that can 
influence the effectiveness of the internal audit process, the line of communication and thus 
the reliance placed on the results. The most direct relationship is that of the Minister of Police 
representing the principal and the Commissioner of Police representing the agent. However, 
within the police itself there is also an indirect principal/agent interrelationship between the 
Commissioner as the Chair of the Risk Management and Audit Committee and the manager 
of the internal audit function. The external auditors are also agents of the Minister and hence 
efficient and effective communication, reliance and overall decision-useful information is 
imperative for true accountability within the public sector. 
 
Future research will extend this study to include the ABC Police Audit Committee as well as 
examine more closely the effectiveness of BAMR. It is then intended to expand the research 
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to include all state government agencies. The ABC Police has provided insights into why 
there are occasions where external audit is unable to place reliance on the work of the internal 
auditors given insurmountable barriers, such as geographic size of the operational area and 
risk being interpreted more from an operational rather than a financial perspective. Further 
investigation could also determine if this is the case throughout Australia and in countries 
such as New Zealand and the United Kingdom. It also provides an opportunity to investigate 
audit in this unique area – that of police – across Australia and the world. 
 
Notes 
1. To ensure confidentiality the state referred to in Australia will just be known as ABC 
State and the police force ABC Police. Further, legislation will not be directly 
referenced in order to preserve this confidentiality. 
 
2. A total of 12 staff are employed in MAU, however, one was on long-term sick leave 
and the other two chose not to participate. The researchers were requested not to 
include personal information here so as not to identify any particular staff member. 
 
3. BAMR: The Police Service operates an internal audit system known as 'Business 
Area Management Review' (BAMR). In short, BAMR involves senior police officers 
auditing various aspects of the record-keeping and operations of police stations on a 
regular basis so that all aspects are audited at least once during a twelve month period. 
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Public Sector Audit Quality Project 
ABC Police 






Please provide a response to the questions below. If you do not have sufficient space to 
provide your answers please feel free to use additional note paper and append to this sheet. 
 
1. What is your position title? 
 
2. What is your highest level of education and in which discipline (eg Degree, Diploma, 
Post-grad)?  
 
3. What year was your qualification achieved?     
 
4. What professional accreditation(s) do you possess? (eg. CIA, CPA, CA, FAICD)  
 
5. Number of PD hours completed (on average) annually   
 
6. What PD topics did you participant in over the past 12 months (eg audit, IFRS, 
governance, risk)?  
 
7. Where were these events held (eg Perth, interstate)?    
 
8. How many years have you worked as an internal auditor?   
 
9. Has your experience been in the public sector only or public (______ yrs) and private 
sector (_____yrs) 
 
10. How many years have you served with ABC Police?    
 
 
    
 
If you have used a separate sheet(s) of paper to answer any of the above questions, please 
staple to this sheet and write below the number of sheets including this one. 
 





Public Sector Audit Quality Project 
ABC Police Interview Guide 
Internal Auditor(s) 
 
1. To whom are you immediately accountable? 
 
2. Who is your director? 
 
3. Who is the audit team leader? 
 
4. Who reports to you? 
 
5. What are the main objectives of Internal Audit within your organisation? Please rank 
these in order of importance. 
 
6. Do you have an Internal Audit strategy/charter agreed by the Audit Committee? 
 
7. How many years forward does the Internal Audit Strategy/Charter project? 
 
8. Briefly outline the quality control system utilised within the internal audit department. 
 
9. Do you believe the QA system is effective and reliable? Can you recount an instance 
where it was useful in your work? 
 
10. Do you ever seek independent advice from outside the organisation on an issue? 
 
11. Do you have a compliance framework in place? 
 
12. Is any of the internal audit work outsourced? If so, what percentage? What specific type 
of work is outsourced? 
 
13. With state government agencies being asked to reduce their spending by 3% has this 
had an impact on your department? 
 
14. If you answered 'yes' to Q13, explain how. 
 
15. With more emphasis on risk management within the organisation, how has this 
impacted on your department in terms of work hours / duties / staffing? 
 
16. Does your organisation train and develop existing staff or recruit experienced staff from 
outside the organisation? 
 
17. What is your relationship with the audit committee? 
 
18. Do you have easy access to the chair of the audit committee if necessary? 
 
19. How often do you meet with the external auditor (OAG or its representative firm)? 




20. How much do you perceive the OAG relies upon the internal audit work (eg 100%; 
60% etc)? In other words, what value is placed on internal audit reports by the OAG. 
 
21. With respect to your interaction with external auditors do you coordinate your work 
with respect to areas of audit coverage; work schedule? 
 
22. Do the external auditors have free access to all of your work papers; reports? 
 
23. What is your perception on the nature and extent of the external auditor's reliance on 
internal audit work? 
 
24. How much do you perceive management rely upon the work you prepare for them (eg 
100%, 60% etc)? In other words, what value is placed on internal audit reports by 
management. 
 
25. Have you discovered any frauds in the last three years (this will obviously need to be in 
general – privacy)? 
 
26. If you answered 'yes' for Q25 how was this risk managed so there was less chance of a 
recurrence? 
 
27. To what extent are internal audit services requested within the organisation? 
 
28. When reporting your major findings, do you include an executive summary? 
 
29. When reporting your major findings, do you present these to the executive? 
 
30. Are management comments incorporated into your final report? 
 
31. Do you report all findings to the audit committee? 
 







Public Sector Audit Quality Project 
External Auditor Interview Guide 
 
Q: What are the main audit objectives of external audit in relation to the ABC Police audit?  Please 
rank these in order of importance. 
 
Q: What is your role in the audit planning of the ABC Police audit? 
 
Q: What proportion of the total audit hours is devoted to audit planning? 
 
Q: Briefly outline the review processes around the ABC Police audit 
 
Q: Is any of the internal audit work outsourced?  If so, what percentage?  What specific type of work 
is outsourced? 
 
Q: With state government agencies being asked to reduce their spending by 3%, what impact has this 
had on your department? 
 
Q: How does the OAG train and develop existing staff to ensure they are up to date on the latest 
developments in audit methodology, public sector issues etc from outside the organisation? 
 
Q: To what extent does the OAG recruit externally to fill gaps in experience and technical audit 
skills?  What is the largest source of external recruits? 
 
Q: What is the relationship between the audit team and the audit committee? 
 
Q: How would you describe the accessibility of the chair of the audit committee?   
 
Q: How often do you meet with the internal auditor?  With whom does the audit team 
specifically meet? 
 
Q: How much does the audit team rely upon the internal audit work (e.g. 100%, 60% etc) in 
completing the audit? 
 
Q: If reliance is placed on the work of the internal auditor, please outline what areas of 
internal audit work would be relied on most often. 
 
Q: Please identify and rank the top 3 factors that are taken into account when deciding whether or not, 
and to what extent to rely on the work of the internal auditor? 
 
Q: Does the audit team have free access to all of the internal audit work papers; reports? 
 
Q: Have you discovered any frauds in the last 3 years? 
 
Q: When reporting your major findings, please outline the chain of reporting 
 
Q: What is the nature of the findings that get reported to the audit committee? 
 
